Some Kind of Right by Mathews, Jud
Penn State Law eLibrary 
Journal Articles Faculty Works 
2020 
Some Kind of Right 
Jud Mathews 
Follow this and additional works at: https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/fac_works 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons 








The Right to Be Forgotten I and II remind us – if anyone could have forgotten – 
that Europe today is a Europe of rights.1 What motivates the German Federal 
Constitutional Court (GFCC) to act in the Right to Be Forgotten II, on the Court’s 
telling, is the discovery of a gap in Europe’s rights architecture. The problem: 
for legal provisions fully harmonized under European Union (EU) law, EU 
rights protections take precedence over the fundamental rights in Germany’s 
constitution, the Basic Law. But the court with ultimate responsibility for 
vindicating EU fundamental rights, the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU), cannot hear rights claims in every situation that the GFCC 
could.2 In the Europe of rights, a gap in rights protection generates a response 
from courts roughly analogous to what a gap in U.S.-Soviet missile stockpiles 
would produce among Cold War military planners: a scramble to close it. And 
so the GFCC leaps into the breach, ruling that it can review the application of 
EU law by German authorities for conformity with EU fundamental rights in 
situations such as this.  
 
One of the most cited American administrative law articles is a 1975 piece 
penned by Judge Henry Friendly and titled Some Kind of Hearing.3 The piece 
 
* Professor of Law, Penn State Law. 
1 I borrow the phrase from Helen Keller and Alec Stone Sweet. THE EUROPE OF RIGHTS: 
THE IMPACT OF THE ECHR ON NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS (Hellen Keller & Alec Stone 
Sweet eds., 2008). Their book concerns the European Convention of Human Rights.  
2 While individuals can directly bring challenges to EU acts in the CJEU under Article 263 
TFEU, individuals cannot bring challenges in the CJEU to national legislation that implements 
EU law. Rather, the CJEU reviews such legislation only via the Article 267 preliminary 
reference procedure, and preliminary references can be made only by courts. Under the 
expansive individual complaint provision of the Basic Law, litigants in German courts can 
normally seek GFCC review when they believe their fundamental rights to be violated, see 
Basic Law art. 93 para. 1 lit. 4a. In areas of fully harmonized EU law, however, it is only EU 
fundamental rights and not German fundamental rights that apply. 
3 Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PENN. L. REV. 1267 (1975). The phrase “some 
kind of hearing” is taken from Supreme Court Justice Byron White’s majority opinion in Wolff 
v.McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974).  
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reflected on the “due process revolution” in U.S. constitutional law, at the 
heart of which was the idea that persons were entitled to a hearing of some 
sort when facing adverse government action in a broad range of circumstances. 
The Right to Be Forgotten II crystallizes one lesson from Europe’s rights 
revolution: persons should be able to call on some kind of right to protect their 
important interests whenever those interests are threatened under the law. 
Which rights instrument should be deployed, and by what court, become 
secondary concerns. 
 
The GFCC’s high-minded rights talk might fall flat with a cynic, or with a 
political scientist who studies courts (but I repeat myself). To such an observer, 
the Right to Be Forgotten II is another confirmation that the GFCC is one of 
Europe’s most powerful constitutional courts because it is one of its canniest. 
From its earliest days, the GFCC has fought challenges to its authority and 
relevance by crafting a constitutional jurisprudence that ensures the Court a 
central role in Germany’s governance processes. An important chapter in this 
story is the Court’s third-party effect doctrine, as inaugurated, famously, in the 
1958 Lüth decision and expanded in the following decades, pursuant to which 
the values encoded in constitutional rights penetrate the entirety of law, 
including the private law.4 When the GFCC suits up as the “Defender of the 
Constitution” to extend the reach of Basic Law rights, as a nifty side-effect it 
extends its own reach. But the old playbook works less well once European 
law starts displacing national law. In a world of Europeanizing law, a court that 
lacks the competence to say what EU law means faces a loss of relevance and 
influence. And so from a strategic perspective, it makes sense that the GFCC, 
which had ridden the rights of the Basic Law so far, would dismount and 
saddle up the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.  
 
Ultimately, it is no criticism of the Right to Be Forgotten II to say that it advances 
the GFCC’s role in European governance, so long as the decision also makes 
sense in the context of the European and German law. My aim here is to argue 
that it does, for a specific reason. The Right to Be Forgotten II represents a 
sensible approach to managing the complex pluralism of the legal environment 
in which Germany and other EU member states find themselves. 
 
I do not intend to join the debate over how to properly characterize Europe’s 
legal pluralism: as a feature of European constitutionalism, or an alternative to 
 
4 JUD MATHEWS, EXTENDING RIGHTS’ REACH: CONSTITUTIONS, PRIVATE LAW, AND 
JUDICIAL POWER (2018).  
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constitutionalism.5 At this point, I just want to make the case that pluralism 
runs deep in the European legal order and poses challenges for participants in 
its legal systems. In order to set up the argument, I begin with a few gestures 
in the direction of legal theory. 
 
The differences among competing theories of law often turn out to be, in 
significant part, differences of emphasis, and the bumper sticker versions of 
different theories often make plain what is being emphasized. What stands out 
about Neil MacCormick’s concept of law as “institutionalized normative 
order”6—in contrast, say, with H.L.A. Hart’s “union of primary and secondary 
rules”7—is the centrality of institutions. Institutions play several roles in law, 
including creating and enforcing legal norms, and—of particular importance 
for present purposes—they make norms more complete by elaborating their 
meaning, often in the course of deciding how they apply in concrete cases. 
This latter role is associated in particular with courts, although interpretation 
is neither the exclusive province of courts nor courts’ only activity. 
 
MacCormick’s integration of institutions into the concept of law itself makes 
particular sense in light of an essential characteristic of most norms: they are 
not fully determinate. (Just ask the cyclist, the Segway rider, and the ambulance 
driver trying to determine if they are allowed into H.L.A. Hart’s hypothetical 
park.8) For law to work as law requires a body that can say authoritatively how 
norms apply in concrete cases. It is not as though other legal theorists are 
unaware that institutions play important roles in legal systems, of course, but 
MacCormick’s commitment to the ineluctable “institutionality” of positive 
municipal law—to the idea that institutions are, in an important sense, part of 
what law is—makes him alert to certain features of law that other theorists 
might skate past.9 His approach suggests, for instance, that “the rules and 
 
5 Compare, e.g., NICO KRISCH, BEYOND CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE PLURALIST STRUCTURE OF 
POSTNATIONAL LAW (2010) with Alec Stone Sweet, The Structure of Constitutional Pluralism, 11 I-
CON 491 (2013).  
6 NEIL MACCORMICK, INSTITUTIONS OF LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL THEORY 11 (2007). 
7 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 79 (1961).  
8 H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 607 (1958). 
Hart famously conjures a rule that forbids taking vehicles into the public park and invokes 
some difficult cases (bicycle, roller skates, toy car) to illustrate his distinction between core of 
a legal rule and the surrounding penumbra of uncertainty.  
9 MACCORMICK, supra note 6, at 13.  
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practices concerning recognition of binding precedents” are a proper subject 
for legal theorists and shape what the law is in different legal systems.10   
 
A stripped-down model of law drawing on MacCormick’s institutional 
perspective can focus on two elements: norms, and the institutions that say 
how they apply (which, for simplicity’s sake, I will call courts). Such a model 
offers a good starting point for thinking about pluralism in its different forms. 
As the ideal type of non-pluralist law, we can imagine a legal system that 
features a single body of norms and a single set of courts responsible for 
interpreting those norms. The norms are internally consistent, or else contain 
conflict rules that direct which takes precedence in the case of inconsistency 
(e.g., constitutional norms trump legislative norms). Call a body of norms with 
those features well-ordered norms. Similarly, the courts have jurisdictions that 
do not overlap, or else they are ordered hierarchically. Let’s call courts with 
these features well-ordered courts. 
 
In life, of course, it is rare for everything to be well ordered, and in many legal 
systems, there are at least some elements of pluralism. Alec Stone Sweet and 
Clare Ryan offer a useful distinction for thinking about the forms pluralism 
can take. We can have source pluralism (or following the nomenclature I used 
above, norm pluralism) when there is more than one body of norms that 
applies in a legal system—or, what amounts to the same thing, where the 
governing norms are not well ordered.11 We can also have jurisdictional 
pluralism (which I will call court pluralism) where we have multiple court 
systems operating (or, equivalently, a non-well-ordered court system).12  
 
Of the two, norm pluralism is the easier to manage. The existence of 
competing bodies of norms can create confusion, most concretely for the 
parties the norms apply to. It is possible that norms can give contradictory 
guidance to an addressee, but so long as the court system is well-ordered, the 
legal system will be able to resolve the conflict one way or another and work 




10 Id. at 57, 57-58.  
11 ALEC STONE SWEET & CLARE RYAN, A COSMOPOLITAN LEGAL ORDER 82-83 (2018). 
Stone Sweet and Ryan write specifically about rights protection regimes, but the distinction is 
useful for thinking about pluralism in legal systems more generally. 
12 Id. at 83. 
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Court pluralism poses a greater challenge. Even if courts dispose over a shared 
body of norms, court pluralism entails the possibility that they will arrive at 
contradictory interpretations. It seems reasonable to suppose that, the more 
open-ended the norms, the higher the potential that courts could develop 
divergent approaches. Norm pluralism can sap the law’s ability to give 
guidance, at least until a court steps in to resolve conflicts between norms, but 
court pluralism raises the still more alarming prospect that different courts 
could impose mutually incompatible obligations on parties. 
 
When we have competing bodies of norms and competing systems of courts, 
the possibilities for conflicts multiply, especially when the content of the 
competing bodies of norms is substantially different. Nor is it the case, when 
both norm pluralism and court pluralism are in play, that courts necessarily 
must limit themselves to interpreting “their” norms: courts can maintain their 
own views about what “the other’s” law require.  We can call the result 
crossover pluralism. Europe is a legal environment where this kind of robust 
pluralism obtains. It should not be surprising that MacCormick, with his 
attention to the interplay between norms and institutions, was one of the first 
scholars to devote serious attention to European legal pluralism.13 
 
Operating in a legal system with this kind of robust pluralism places significant 
demands on all involved. What this simple model does not make clear is that 
pluralism is at least partly endogenous to the process of judicial dispute 
resolution. In other words, in the course of deciding cases, courts may have 
the opportunity to address questions about how different bodies of law or the 
authority of different courts relate. Their responses have the potential to make 
the legal environment more or less coherent. A challenge that courts face in 
robustly pluralistic environments is managing that pluralism through their 
rulings so that the legal system provides reasonably clear guidance to the 
individuals and entities to whom norms are addressed.   
 
By these lights, the Right To Be Forgotten II does a good job. Yes, the decision 
does increase crossover pluralism by making the GFCC, for the first time, a 
co-curator of the EU Charter, alongside the CJEU.14 But at the same time, it 
is part of a broader move by the GFCC tending to cabin norm pluralism, by 
 
13 NEIL MACCORMICK, Beyond the Sovereign State, 56 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1993).  
14 While this is the first case in which the GFCC has taken upon itself to hear challenges based 
on European fundamental rights, the phenomenon of national courts in Europe ruling on 
questions of European law is itself nothing new. See, e.g., KRISCH, supra note 5, at 292.  
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partitioning the legal landscape into different domains and assigning a single 
body of norms priority over each.  So the First Senate in the Right To Be 
Forgotten II makes clear that, in areas of full harmonization, EU law boxes out 
the Basic Law, just as in the Right to Be Forgotten I it provides that the Basic Law 
takes priority in matters not fully harmonized. The decision limits the potential 
for conflicts between the GFCC and the CJEU, even though both are 
interpreting the same rights instrument. Under the Right To Be Forgotten II, the 
GFCC will be stepping in to make pronouncements on the meaning of EU 
Charter rights only in situations where the CJEU, for jurisdictional reasons, 
could not. The GFCC has a strong argument that, by ensuring that EU Charter 
rights apply to all challenges in areas of full harmonization, it is not only 
fulfilling its obligation to aid European integration, but making the law more, 
rather than less, coherent.   
 
That being said, how this approach works out in practice will depend on how 
the GFCC performs its new role going forward. If substantively, the body of 
EU charter jurisprudence that the GFCC develops diverges from the CJEU’s 
over time, then the Right To Be Forgotten II could come to stand as a source of 
legal inconsistency. And while the GFCC acknowledged the CJEU as the final 
authority on EU rights, one could not describe the German court’s approach 
to CJEU precedent in the Right To Be Forgotten II case as one of strictest fidelity. 
Though the CJEU had found that the right of personality took precedence in 
the cases it had decided, the First Senate breezily distinguished those decisions 
in justifying its own approach to the balancing of interests.  
 
But the prominence of balancing in their rights adjudication is what may keep 
the GFCC and CJEU from straying too noticeably from each other. The rights 
jurisprudence of both courts is built around proportionality review, in which 
balancing plays a central role. In proportionality systems, what courts owe to 
rights claimants is not so much a particular outcome as a particular decision-
making procedure.15 By design, proportionality is highly sensitive to the 
particulars of disputes, and the balancing analysis is open-ended enough that, 
 
15 See ALEC STONE SWEET AND JUD MATHEWS, PROPORTIONALITY BALANCING AND 
GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: A GLOBAL AND COMPARATIVE APPROACH (2019). The 
canonical proportionality analysis asks whether a measure alleged to violate a fundamental 
right: (1) serves a proper purpose, (2) is a suitable means of achieving the purpose, and (3) 
infringes on a fundamental protected no more than alternative measures that serve the same 
purpose equally well. If the challenged measure passes all of these tests, the court proceeds to 
ask whether it is proportional in the strict sense: that is, whether the measure’s benefit to the 
common good outweigh the harm it imposes on the right.  
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in a given case, courts could frequently justify more than one possible result. 
In other words, the wide tolerances of proportionality mean that a range of 
outcomes can count as consistent. Proportionality also helps explain why the 
GFCC can so casually switch from the Basic Law to the EU Charter as the 
basis for its review. Not much is at stake in whether the GFCC operates under 
the banner of European or German fundamental rights if the Court can 
essentially proceed the same way: by plugging the facts into proportionality 
analysis.16  
 
How this all plays out in practice is something that will only become clear over 
time. Lawyers and scholars will keep a close eye on the ruling’s impact for years 




16 See Walther Michl, In Vielfalt geeinte Grundrechte, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Nov. 27, 2019), 
https://verfassungsblog.de/in-vielfalt-geeinte-grundrechte/.  
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